This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik (1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how much it is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker also proposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they are matched. The matchmaker chooses a matching to maximize pro…t (the sum of the di¤erence between the o¤ering and asking salaries from each matched …rm-worker). First, we show that Nash equilibrium may generate ine¢ cient outcomes, but the matchmaker's pro…t is always zero in every Nash equilibrium. Second, we show that the sets of stable assignments and strong Nash equilibria are equivalent. These results extend to the Kelso-Crawford (1982) many-to-one assignment problem. Interestingly, in the one-to-one matching case, our results are closely related to the common agency game by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , while in the many-to-one assignment problem, such relationships break down completely. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers:
Introduction
In their in ‡uential paper, Shapley and Shubik (1971) introduce an assignment problem which is a transferrable utility (cooperative) game in a twosided matching model. Each …rm's output level is a¤ected by which worker it is matched with, and salaries are determined endogenously by considering the stability of the assignment. They show that a stable assignment generates an e¢ cient matching, and the core and the set of stable assignments are equivalent. Moreover, the set of market equilibria is equivalent to the core. Kelso and Crawford (1982) generalize the assignment model by allowing …rms to choose how many workers to hire, and analyzing the market equilibrium and the core. They also consider a central planning authority that matches up …rms and workers, and analyze a price adjustment mechanism by generalizing the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962; Roth and Sotomayor 1990) . Their algorithm …nds the …rm-optimal stable assignment which is a market equilibrium and a core allocation. As in many centralized market clearing mechanisms successfully used in the real world, such as entry-level medical markets and school choice problems, Kelso and Crawford (1982) assume that the matchmaker is a benevolent central planner who tries to achieve a desirable allocation-a market equilibrium.
By contrast, in this paper, we consider a self-interest-motivated matchmaker. She chooses a matching of …rms and workers that maximizes pro…t. In this setup, we want to ask the following questions: How much pro…t can the matchmaker make? What properties would the resulting allocation have? Are there any di¤erences between one-to-one and many-to-one markets?
Speci…cally, we will …rst consider a two-stage noncooperative game in the Shapley-Shubik assignment problem with a matchmaker. In the …rst stage, each …rm proposes how much it is willing to pay each worker if they are matched, and each worker proposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they are matched. These proposals are made simultaneously. Then, in the second stage, the matchmaker matches up …rms and workers in order to maximize pro…ts (the sum of the di¤erence between the o¤ering and asking salaries from each matched …rm-worker). 1 We will use Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959 ) as solution concepts. 2 This simple game generates a few interesting results. First, in every (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium, the matchmaker makes zero rent 3 (Theorem   1) . Second, the set of stable assignments (the core) is equivalent to the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes (Theorem 2). Also, this set is equivalent to the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes when we restrict players' strategies to truthful strategies. In this one-to-one setup, our matchmaker game can be reinterpreted as a common agency game.
Our results extend to a general Kelso-Crawford many-to-one assignment problem (Kelso and Crawford 1982) . Even without the gross substitute condition, the matchmaker's rent is zero in every Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3), and the sets of stable assignments and strong Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent (Theorem 4).
Our matchmaker game in the one-to-one assignment problem is closely related to the common agency game introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) . In a common agency game, there are multiple principals (players) and an agent, and a set of actions. All players and the agent have preferences over actions, and each player o¤ers a contribution schedule to the agent, which is a function from the action set to a monetary contribution. The agent sees the players'contribution schemes and chooses the action that has the highest total payo¤. De…ning truthful strategies, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that the set of Nash equilibria with truthful strategies is equivalent to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria, which is a consistent re…nement of Nash equilibria based on communications among players. 4 Laussel and Le Breton (2001) show that the set of truthful equilibrium outcomes is the core in a cooperative game that is generated from the common agency game if and only if the agent earns zero rent in all truthful Nash equilibria (the no-rent property). Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) show that coalition-proof Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria are equivalent if and only if a common agency game has the no-rent property. Our one-to-one matchmaker game can be reinterpreted as a common agency game. Thus, given our zero rent result in all Nash equilibria (Theorem 1), our equivalence result between the sets of strong Nash equilibria and stable assignments (Theorem 2) can be shown by using the results in common agency games. 5 However, interestingly, although our matchmaker game can be interpreted as a common agency game if the assignment problem is one-to-one, it does not allow such an interpretation when the assignment problem is many-to-one: …rms are bidding on each subset of workers instead of bidding on each individual worker. A truthful Nash equilibrium may give the matchmaker a positive rent in a common agency game generated from many-to-one assignment problem (Example 4). Even if we assume an additive environment (Alcalde et al. 1998 ) and decompose each multi-position-…rm into one-position …rms, we cannot restore the equivalence of the sets of stable assignments and truthful Nash equilibrium outcomes (Example 5). Implementation results are obtained in the Kelso-Crawford many-to-one assignment problem with monetary transfers. Alcalde et al. (1998) show that the stable correspondence (competitive equilibrium correspondence) is subgameperfect-Nash-implementable by a simple two-stage game. Hayashi and Sakai (2009) characterize the stable correspondence by Nash implementation. Note that their results cannot treat the one-to-one problem or a many-to-one problem with quotas. By noting that all Nash equilibrium outcomes are individually rational, we can show that the individually rational correspondence is Nash-implementable by our matchmaker game in the one-to-one problem by our matchmaker game by utilizing Theorem 1 (Corollary 1). Theorems 2 and 4 directly show that a stable assignment correspondence is strong-Nashimplementable in a general domain of one-to-one and many-to-one assignment problems (Corollaries 2 and 4). These results are not dependent on the presence of quotas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the (one-to-one) Shapley-Shubik assignment problem and our matchmaker game are introduced with a few examples. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 generalizes our results to the many-to-one assignment problem. Section 5 concludes with discussions on the relationship of our results with common agency games.
The Model

The Shapley-Shubik Model
In this section, we de…ne the assignment problem as laid out by Shapley and Shubik (1971) . 6 There are two disjoint …nite sets of players: the set of …rms F with jF j = I and the set of workers W with jW j = J.
In the basic model, we assume that each …rm can hire at most one worker. If …rm f 2 F hires worker w 2 W , f can earn y f w as its output (gross pro…t). After paying salary x to w, f 's payo¤ is y f w x. If f does not hire any worker, its output and pro…t are zero (y f f = 0). Let Y = (y f w ) f 2F;w2W be an output matrix, and let Y be the set of all possible output matrices. If hired by f , w receives disutility d wf . With salary x, w's payo¤ is x d wf . If unemployed, then w receives zero disutility (d ww = 0). We assume that d wf 0 for all f 2 F and all w 2 W . Let D = (d wf ) w2W;f 2F be a disutility matrix, and let D be the set of all possible disutility matrices.
A matching : W [F ! W [F is a bijection (a one-to-one function) such that (i) (f ) = w if and only if (w) = f , and (ii) (f ) 2 F implies (f ) = f and (w) 2 W implies (w) = w. Let M be the set of all matchings. Similarly, for S W [ F , a matching in S, S : S ! S is a bijection such that (i) (f ) = w 2 W \ S if and only if (w) = f 2 F \ S, and (ii) (f ) 2 F \ S implies (f ) = f and (w) 2 W \ S implies (w) = w. Let M(S) be the set of all matchings in S. An e¢ cient matching is de…ned by 
The Matchmaker Game
Consider a mechanism by which a matchmaker matches up …rms and workers. This matchmaker can be regarded as a private …rm, or as a central planning authority who chooses a matching based on information submitted by …rms and workers. In the …rst stage, a matchmaker asks each …rm how much it is willing to o¤er each worker if the pair is matched, and asks each worker how much salary she demands from each …rm's position. That is, each …rm f 2 F submits f : W ! R + (or f = ( f (w)) w2W ), and each worker w submits s w : F ! R + (or s w = (s w (f )) f 2F ). These are their strategies. The matchmaker is allowed to take the di¤erence between f (w) and s w (f ) if she matches f and w. Needless to say, the matchmaker would not match a pair (f; w) if f (w) < s w (f ): it would rather leave them unmatched.
In the second stage, with these submitted pieces of information (strategy pro…le) = ( f ) f 2F and s = (s w ) f 2F , the matchmaker maximizes its pro…t
Each …rm f , worker w and the matchmaker obtain the following payo¤s under 2 M ( ; s):
and
respectively. 7 We assume that …rms and workers have complete information on this game. We call this game a (one-to-one) matchmaker game. Note that each …rm f only cares about (f ), and the rest of the matching is irrelevant to it. Similarly, each worker w only cares about (w). An outcome of a matchmaker game is ( ; ( ; s)). An outcome ( ; ( ; s )) is a Nash equi-
, and (iii) there is no w 2 W such that s w : F ! R + and 2 M ( ; s w ; s w ) such that u w ( ; ; s w ; s w ) > u w ( ; ; s ). An outcome ( ; ( ; s )) is a (strictly) 7 Payo¤s to unmatched …rms and workers are zero: v f ( ; ; s) = 0 if (f ) = f and u w ( ; ; s) = 0 if (w) = w. u w ( ; ; s ) for all w 2 S \ W with at least one strict inequality.
In the one-to-one matchmaker game, another re…nement of Nash equilibrium turns out to be useful. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we de…ne "truthful strategies" as follows. For …rm f , a strategy f is said to be truthful relative to w 2 W [ ff g if and only if for all w 2 W [ ff g either (i)
and f (w) = 0. For worker w, a strategy s w is said to be truthful relative to f 2 F [ fwg if and only if for all f 2 F [ fwg,
) is a truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium, and all players'strategies are truthful relative to .
Examples
In this subsection, we will illustrate what Nash and truthful Nash equilibria look like. We start with a very simple example. Example 1. There are two …rms ff 1 ; f 2 g and one worker fw 1 g. Let y f 1 w 1 = 2, y f 2 w 1 = 3 and d w 1 f 1 = d w 1 f 2 = 0. Even in this simple example, there are multiple Nash equilibria with di¤erent matchings of a …rm with the worker. Let f 1 (w 1 ) = 1 and f 2 (w 1 ) = 0, and s w 1 (f 1 ) = 1 and s w 1 (f 2 ) = 4. Under this strategy pro…le, the matchmaker chooses (f 1 ) = w 1 and (f 2 ) = f 2 , and makes no pro…t. This is a Nash equilibrium, but the resulting matching is ine¢ cient. This ine¢ ciency is due to a coordination failure. Firm f 2 wants to hire w 1 , but somehow w 1 is asking unreasonable salary, so f 2 does has no incentive to try to hire w 1 . So, it o¤ers zero salary to w 1 . Worker w 1 sees f 2 o¤er zero salary, and so has no incentive to reduce her salary demand for f 2 .
In contrast, let f 2 (w 1 ) = x and f 1 (w 1 ) = 2, and s w 1 (f 1 ) = x and
. If the matchmaker chooses 0 (f 2 ) = w 1 and 0 (f 1 ) = f 1 (indeed, unless x = 2, she must choose 0 ), this is a truthful Example 1a: Ine¢ cient NE Example 1b: TNE achieve e¢ ciency strategy, since f 1 is indi¤erent between hiring w 1 or not. In contrast, f 2 is strictly better o¤ hiring w 1 , unless x = 3. Thus, any salary x 2 [2; 3] can be supported by a truthful Nash equilibrium, and e¢ ciency is achieved. Since there is no pro…table deviation from such an allocation, it is also a strong Nash equilibrium. Note that each of these allocations is a stable assignment.
Example 1 shows that Nash equilibria in matchmaker games can generate ine¢ cient matchings. However, if players use truthful strategies, then the resulting matching is e¢ cient, and the set of truthful Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of stable assignments. Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, the matchmaker's rent is zero in all Nash equilibria. In the next two examples, we consider slightly more general situations and show that the matchmaker's rent is still zero.
Example 2. There are two …rms ff 1 ; f 2 g and two workers fw 1 ; w 2 g. Let y f 1 w 1 = 3 and y f 1 w 2 = y f 2 w 1 = y f 2 w 2 = 0, and let d w j f i = 0 for all i; j = 1; 2. Clearly, the e¢ cient matching involves (f 1 ) = w 1 . Suppose that the matchmaker is earning a positive rent in a Nash equilibrium at least from the pair ff 1 ; w 1 g by choosing . If this is the case, f 1 (w 1 ) > s w 1 (f 1 ) holds. This can happen only when both f 1 and w 1 have reasons such that they cannot ask for more. In the former case, f 1 is afraid to reduce f 1 (w 1 ), since in that case f 2 would hire w 1 : for this to happen,
In the latter case, w 1 is afraid to increase s w 1 (f 1 ) since in that case f 1 would choose w 2 . For this to happen, f 1 (w 1 ) s w 1 (f 1 ) = f 1 (w 2 ) s w 2 (f 1 ) must hold. However, if these two hold, then the matchmaker will choose matching 0 such that 0 (f 1 ) = w 2 and 0 (f 2 ) = w 1 . This matching does not do any good to …rms, so it cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Thus, in this example, the Nash equilibrium rent must be zero. By the same logic as in Example 1, the set of outcomes of truthful Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of stable assignments.
Example 3. There are two …rms ff 1 ; f 2 g and two workers fw 1 ; w 2 g. Let y f 1 w 1 = y f 2 w 2 = 3 and y f 1 w 2 = y f 2 w 1 = 0, and let d w j f i = 0 for all i; j = 1; 2. Clearly, the e¢ cient matching is (f 1 ) = w 1 , and (f 2 ) = w 2 . Suppose that the matchmaker is earning a positive rent in a Nash equilibrium at least from the pair ff 1 ; w 1 g by choosing . Again, let us assume
Repeating the same logic in Example 2,
Thus, for to be chosen by the matchmaker, f 2 (w 2 ) s w 2 (f 2 ) > 0 also needs to hold. However, this pair is then also necessarily threatened. As a result, we conclude that
, f 1 can earn more. This is because the matchmaker is made indi¤erent between and 0 by this change. As a result, this cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Thus, in this example again, the Nash equilibrium rent must be zero. Repeating the same logic, the set of outcomes of truthful Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of stable assignments.
In the next section, we will investigate whether the above observations are not a mere coincidence.
The Main Results
Before stating our theorem, we introduce some notation. For all S N , 2 M(N ), let C(S; ) fk 2 S : (k) 2 S and (k) 6 = kg. That is, C(S; ) is the set of members of S who have partners in S under matching (coupled). Given a strategy pro…le ( ; s) 2 R I J + R J I + , let R(S; ( ; s); ) be the rent generated in S under such that R(S; ( ; s);
. Let R (S; ( ; s)) max 2M(S) R(S; ( ; s); ) and let A (S; ( ; s)) arg max 2M(S) R(S; ( ; s); ) be the maximum rent generated in coalition S given …rms'strategies and workers'strategies s, and its associated matching , respectively. We can characterize Nash equilibrium payo¤s in an interesting way. Proposition 1. In the one-to-one matchmaker game, in every Nash equilibrium (( ; s); ), R (N; ( ; s)) = R (N nfkg; ( ; s)) for all k 2 N .
Proof. Since any worker's deviation incentive can be treated in a symmetric manner, we will focus on a …rm's deviation incentive. It is easy to see that the statement is trivial when
Suppose that the …rm reduces the salary o¤ers uniformly by > 0: i.e., Since R (N; ( ; s)) = R (N; ( ; s) ; ) and R (N n ff g ; ( ; s)) = R(N; ( ; s) ; 0 ), we have the desired result.
Let 2 M(N nfkg) be such that R (N nfkg; ( ; s)) = R(N nfkg; ( ; s); ), and let S k = fk 0 2 N nfkg : (k 0 ) 6 = k 0 g. This implies that R (S k ; ( ; s)) = R(S k ; ( ; s); ) = R (N nfkg; ( ; s)). Proposition 1 says that in every Nash equilibrium (( ; s); ), for all k 2 N , there exists S k N nfkg such that the following equation holds:
We call the above a system of fundamental equations. 8 The …rst main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In the one-to-one matchmaker game, the matchmaker's rent is zero in every Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium allocation (( ; s); ) with positive rent (R(N; ( ; s); ) = R (N; ( ; s)) > 0), and we will reach a contradiction. First, note that R(N; ( ; s); ) = P f 2C(N; )\F R(ff; (f )g; ( ; s); ). Pick up a pair (f 1 ; w 1 ) N that generates the highest positive rent under ( ; s) and :
( )
The relevant fundamental equations for f 1 and w 1 can be written as
R(ff; (f )g; ( ; s); ) 8 Our system of fundamental equations is inspired by the system of fundamental equations in Laussel and Le Breton (2001). However, these two systems of equations are very di¤erent from each other. The one by Laussel and Le Breton is generated from maximizing each coalition's value, while ours is generated for each Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le ( ; s). This di¤erence re ‡ects the di¤erence of the notions of no-rent properties in these two papers. The no-rent property by Laussel and Le Breton (2001) concerns all truthful Nash equilibria, but our no-rent result applies to all Nash equilibria. Our …rst lemma is the following.
Proof of Lemma 1. We will prove the …rst half (the second half follows by a symmetric argument). Suppose
Note that the last equality comes from the fundamental equation. This is in contradiction with 2 A (N ). Now, suppose R(f 0 (w 1 ); w 1 g; ( ; s); 0 ) = 0 (if rent is negative, matchmaker would rather leave them unmatched). Then, we have
:
This violates 2 A (N ).
Recall 0 and 00 are matchings that achieve values R (S f 1 ; ( ; s)) and R (S w 1 ; ( ; s)), respectively. By using Lemma 1, we will construct chains of pairs from matchings ; 0 , and 00 . Let f`+ 1 0 (w`) and w`+ 1 = (f`+ 1 )
andf`+ 1 = (w`+ 1 ) for`= 1; 2; :::;L, whereL is such that (w`) 2 C(N; )\F and 0 (f`) 2 C(N; )\W for all`<L and (wL) = 2 C(N; )\F . The following is our key lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Optimality of implies:
00 ). Thus, suppose to the contrary that
. We will analyze the two cases by noting fw 1 ; f 1 g = fw 1 ;f 1 g. Let us start with the simpler case. 
where the last equality comes from
. There is no double counting of players in A. Also note that in the RHS of the above formula, the set of players in the formula is Anfw L ;fLg, and each appears only once. Let 2 M(A) be such that (w`) = f`+ 1 for`= 1; :::; L 1, (f`) =w`+ 1 for`= 1; :::;L 1, (w L ) = w L , and (fL) = fL. Replacing by , the total value in A increases by R(fw 1 ; f 1 g; ( ; s); ). By the prevailing assumption ( ), R(fw 1 ; f 1 g; ( ; s); ) > 0. This contradicts optimality of .
Hence, fw `;f `g = fw`0; f`0g for some`0 2 f2; :::; Lg. Denote the set of players
nw`;f`o as in …gure 2b. There is no double counting in B 1 . Now, consider two matchings in B 1 : and such that (w`) = 0 (w`) for`= 1; :::;`0 1, and (f`) = 00 (f`) for`= 1; :::; ` 1
. We now compare the values of these two. First, 
Note that the contents in the both brackets must be nonnegative since maximizes the total value in N . Since fw 1 ; f 1 g generates the highest rent under ( ; s) and , R(fw 1 ; f 1 g; ( ; s); ) R (fw`0; f`0g ; ( ; s); ) must hold. Thus, R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ) R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ) must hold. If R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ) > R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ), we have a contradiction, so assume that R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ) = R(B 1 ; ( ; s); ). For this to happen, the following three conditions must hold:
1. R(fw 1 ; f 1 g; ( ; s); ) = R (fw`0; f`0g ; ( ; s); ) :
2.
P L =`0 R (fw`; f`g ; ( ; s); ) = P L 1 =`0 R (fw`; f`+ 1 g ; ( ; s); 0 ) :
Recall that fw`0; f`0g = fw `;f `g . Rename w`, f`,w`,f`, L, andL by
, L `0 + 1, andL `+ 1, respectively. Then, we again have exactly the same problem as before:
00 ) as in …gure 2c.
If (case 1) applies, then we have a contradiction. If (case 2) applies, then we again …nd fw`0; f`0g = fw`;f`g, and we can again …nd a cycle set B 2 . If the cycle achieves a strict improvement, we reach a contradiction. So assuming equalities, …rms and workers remained after taking B 2 out still satisfy the above three conditions. Applying this procedure repeatedly, eventually, (case 1) applies (by a …nite number of players). Hence, we conclude that
The last part of the proof of Theorem 1. Now, we will complete the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that P L =1 R(fw`; f`g ; ( ; s) ; ) > P L 1 =1 R(fw`; f`+ 1 g ; ( ; s); 0 ) holds. There are two possibilities: (1)
=1 fw`; f`+ 1 g. In the …rst case, R(S f 1 ; ( ; s); 0 ) < R(N; ( ; s); ). This contradicts fundatmental equation. In the second case, the new matching created from and 0 is broken in the middle.
There are two subcases: Even though there are many Nash equilibria, and many of them generate ine¢ cient outcomes, still the matchmaker receives zero rent in every equilibrium. This result depends heavily on the structure of a two-sided matching market. Every Nash equilibrium generates an individually rational assignment as the matchmaker receives zero rent. The converse is easy to show, too. Corollary 1. In the one-to-one assignment problem, the individually rational correspondence IR : Y D R I+J M is implemented by the matchmaker game in Nash equilibria.
Proof. It is clear that every Nash equilibrium is individually rational. So, we prove the converse. Take an individually rational assignment (v; u; ). For each matched pair (f; w) with (f ) = w, let f (w) = y f w v f ; f (w 0 ) = 0 for all w 0 6 = w, and let s w (f ) = u w + d wf , and set her salary demand s w (f 0 ) at a prohibitively high level for all f 0 6 = f . For each single …rm, let its o¤er be zero salary for all workers, and for each single worker, let her salary demand at a prohibitively high level. This strategy pro…le generates the outcome (v; u; ).
Although Theorem 1 is somewhat surprising by itself, it turns out to be quite useful when we consider a re…nement of Nash equilibrium. We will use truthful strategies for the re…nement. As we have seen in Example 1, matchmaker games involve coordination problems. We also noticed that if Nash equilibrium is re…ned by truthful Nash equilibrium, then a stable assignment is achieved. The next theorem shows that this is not a coincidence by using Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. In the one-to-one matchmaker game, the sets of outcomes of TNE and SNE in our matchmaker game and the set of stable assignments are all equivalent.
Proof. We will prove TNE =) SNE =) stable assignment =) TNE.
(1a. TNE =) stable assignment) Suppose not. Then, there is a TNE ( ; s; ) and pair (f; w) with (f ) 6 = w and equilibrium utilities (v f ; u w ) such that y f w d f w > v f + u w . Since both f and w use truthful strategies, f (w)
This implies that the matchmaker can make a positive rent by matching f and w. However, since every Nash equilibrium generates a zero rent by Theorem 1, so does the TNE. This is a contradiction.
(1b. TNE =) SNE) Suppose not. If there is an improving coalitional deviation, there is at least one pair of players whose payo¤s improve. This implies that the truthful Nash equilibrium is not a stable assignment, which cannot happen given 1a.
(2. SNE =) stable assignment) From Theorem 1, all Nash equilibria have a zero rent; hence so does SNE. Let (v; u; ) be an SNE outcome, and suppose that it is not a stable assignment. Then, there is a pair (f; w) 2 F W such that y f w d wf > v f + u w . Consider 
Since there is no pair that generates positive rent f (w) s w (f ) 0 for the matchmaker, the maximum rent is zero under . 
Many-to-one Assignment
We can extend our domain of the problem to the Kelso-Crawford many-toone assignment problem without imposing any restrictions on complementarity or substitutability of workers (Kelso and Crawford 1982) . 10 Each f 2 F has a …nite position (quota) q f and each position can hold one worker. If …rm f hires W f W workers, then the output would be Y f (W f ), and each worker hired by …rm f has some disutility from working d wf 0 independent of position. A many-to-one matching :
Let M be the set of all matchings . An e¢ cient matching would then be
The de…nition of e¢ cient allocation remains the same. An allocation is individually rational if for all f 2 F and all w 2 W , v f 0 and u w 0. An allocation is acceptable if (i) it is individually rational and (ii) v f + P w2C u w Y f (C) P w2C d wf for all f 2 F and all C (f ). Condition (ii) for acceptable allocation requires that …rm f cannot be better o¤ by …ring some of its workers. Note that individually rationality is equivalent to acceptability in the one-to-one assignment problem, but not in the many-to-one problem. An allocation is a stable assignment if it is individually rational and there is no pair (f;
Clearly, stability requires acceptability.
A matchmaker game under many-to-one assignment (a many-to-one matchmaker game) is de…ned in the same manner as before: each …rm f 2 F submits f : W ! R + and each worker w 2 W submits s w : F ! R + as strategies. Then, the matchmaker choose a many-to-one matching to maximize pro…t.
Proposition 3 11
In the many-to-one matchmaker game, in every Nash equilibrium (( ; s); ), (1A) for all f 2 F with (f ) = ff g, R (N; ( ; s)) = R(N; ( ; s); ) = R (N nff g; ( ; s)); (1B) for all f 2 F with (f ) 6 = ff g, and all w 2 (f ), there exists 0 such that (i) j 0 (f )j < j (f )j, (ii) R (N; ( ; s)) = R(N; ( ; s); 0 ), and (iii) w = 2 0 (f ); and (2) for all w 2 W , there exists 00 such that (i) 00 (w) = w, and (ii) R (N; ( ; s)) = R(N; ( ; s); 00 ) = R (N nfwg; ( ; s)).
Proof. Since (2) is a special case of (1), we focus on case (1). Case (1A) is trivial, since we can use the same matching to achieve the same rent. Thus, we will work on case (1B). Clearly, if f (w) = s w (f ) for all w 2 (f ), then we can …nd a 0 that satis…es all three conditions: the matchmaker makes no money by matching f with workers, so might as well cancel the matching (let 0 (f ) = ff g). Thus, let us focus on (f ) 2 W and f (w) > s w (f ) for some w 2 (f ).
11 It is easy to see that Proposition 1 is a special case of the present proposition. R(N; ( ; s); ) so that j 0 (f )j j (f )j holds.
We further claim that j 0 (f )j < j (f )j. Suppose not. Then we have R(N; ( ; s); 0 ) = R(N; ( ; s); ) and R(N; (
for all w 2 (f ), and 00 f (w) = 0 for all w 6 2 (f ) as the matchmaker is forced to choose . This is a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose not. De…ne R(N; ( ; s); ) R(N; ( ; s); 0 ) > 0 and 
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 utilizes only Proposition 1 and the matchmaker's pro…t-maximizing behavior given the system of net rent on each pair of …rms and workers (generated from and s). Since Proposition 3 implies that Proposition 1 applies to -decomposed matching in an arti…cial one-to-one assignment problem, Theorem 1 directly implies that the same statement holds for the matchmaker game in the manyto-one assignment problem.
Theorem 3. In the many-to-one matchmaker game, the matchmaker's rent is zero in every Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.
12 In the many-to-one assignment problem, the acceptable as-
M is implemented by the matchmaker game in Nash equilibria. Now, we consider an extension of Theorem 2. Unfortunately, there is no natural way to de…ne a truthful equilibrium (as we will see in the conclusion). We can only partially generalize Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. In the many-to-one assignment problem, the set of outcomes of SNE of the matchmaker game is equivalent to the set of stable assignments.
Proof. From Theorem 3, all Nash equilibria have a zero rent, hence so does SNE. Let (v; u; ) be an SNE outcome, and suppose that it is not a stable assignment. Then, there is a pair (f; W f ) 2 F 2 W with jW f j q f such that 
. Since the matchmaker gets no rent, she is happy to match up f and W f to make a positive rent. This is cannot be a SNE. Thus, an SNE outcome is a stable assignment. Now, let (v; u; ) be a stable assignment. Consider the following strategy. For all f 2 F and all w 2 (f ), f (w) = s w (f ) = u w + d wf and f (w 0 ) = 0 and s w 0 (f ) is prohibitively high for w 0 = 2 (f ). The matchmaker chooses and gets zero rent. Given the strategy ( ; ), the matchmaker would create a new match only when a pair (f 0 ; W f 0 ) 2 F 2 W with jW f 0 j q f 0 provide a positive rent. However, by the de…nition of a stable assignment, there is no
u w . Thus, there is no subset of players who agree to o¤er a positive rent to the matchmaker to create a new matching. Thus, a stable assignment is supportable by an SNE.
We cannot extend an equivalence result to TNE even in the additive environment, 13 as we will see in the next section. Corollary 2 also partially extends.
Corollary 4. In the many-to-one assignment problem, assume workers are gross substitutes for each …rm. Then, in every many-to-one assignment problem, the stable assignment correspondence SA : Y D R
I+J
M is implemented by the matchmaker game in SNE.
Without the gross substitutability assumption, SA may be empty-valued. This is why we require the assumption. Note that Corollaries 3 and 4 are not a¤ected by the presence of quotas.
Concluding Remarks: Relationship with Common Agency Games
A common agency game is a complete information multi-principal-oneagent game, introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) . The agent is 13 An additive environment (Alcalde et al. 1998 ) is such that for all f 2 F and all
y f w holds. This environment is neither complementarity nor substitutability, and it can be considered as the simplest way to extend the one-to-one results to the many-to-one domain.
going to choose an action, which will a¤ect her own payo¤ as well as payo¤s of principals. Principals can a¤ect the agent's decision by o¤ering a menu of side payments: a side payment schedule for each possible action. The agent maximizes the sum of her own utility and side payments from the principals when choosing an action. We can consider our matchmaker's problem as a common agency game by interpreting a matching as an action, and letting the matchmaker be intrinsically indi¤erent over (except for side payments).
A common agency game is described by (N + 2) tuples:
where A is the set of actions,
0 denotes an agent, and N is the set of principals. In the extensive form of the game the principals simultaneously o¤er contingent payments to the agent who subsequently chooses an action that maximizes her total payo¤. A strategy for each principal k 2 N is a function
, which is a monetary reward (or punishment) of T k (a) to the agent for selecting a, where b k is the lower bound for payment from principal k. For each action a, principal k receives a net payo¤:
where T = (T k 0 ) k 0 2N is a strategy pro…le. The agent chooses an action that maximizes her total payo¤: the agent selects an action in the set M (T ) with:
The common agency game is merely a game among principals, although, strictly speaking, a tie-breaking rule among M (T ) needs to be speci…ed for the matchmaker.
An outcome of a common agency game is (T; a). An outcome (a ; T ) is a Nash equilibrium if a 2 M (T ) and there is no k 2 N such that 
14 An outcome (a ; T ) is a truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium, and T k is truthful relative to a for all k 2 N . Our matchmaker game in the one-to-one assignment game can be embedded in the class of common agency games by reinterpreting players' strategies.
Proposition 5. The one-to-one matchmaker game can be embedded in the class of common agency games. A TNE in a one-to-one matchmaker game is directly translated to a TNE in a common agency game generated from the matchmaker game, and vice versa.
Proof. Let the matchmaker be the agent, and …rms and workers be principals. Let M be the set of actions A. Firm f receives monetary payo¤
, and the matchmaker's (denoted by 0) monetary payo¤ is V 0 ( ) = 0 for all 2 M.
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Although in the original common agency problem, principals are able to choose any contribution menu over matchings in M, we restrict their strategy sets to contribution menu over potential partners, since agents only care about their partners, not about the entire matching. A strategy for …rm f that is generated from its menu f is a function T f : M ! R + , where T f ( ) f ( (f )). A strategy for worker w that is generated from s w is a function T w : M ! R , where T w ( ) s w ( (w)). We can set a lower bound for the value for T w ( ) without losing anything, since worker w would not be matched anyway, if T w ( ) < y (w)w holds. Thus, we assume that for each
there is a lower bound b k : i.e., T k ( ) b k must be satis…ed for all k 2 N . Thus, a matchmaker game can be represented as a common 14 The constraints imposed on
are clearly satis…ed under truthful strategies. 15 The matchmaker has no preference over the matchings themselves.
agency game. Clearly, a truthful strategy in f or s w can trivially be extended to a truthful strategy T k , and vice versa.
Laussel and Le Breton (2001) de…ne no-rent property as the property that the agent obtains no rent in any TNE. A common agency game possesses the no-rent property if and only if all truthful equilibrium outcomes leave no rent to the matchmaker. Since TNE is a subset of Nash equilibrium, our Theorem 1 shows that our matchmaker game satis…es the no-rent property. Laussel and Le Breton (2001) prove that if a cooperative game from a common agency game is convex, 16 then possesses the no-rent property. Although convexity is satis…ed in an interesting class of common agency games such as the public good provision game, in our assignment problem convexity is clearly not satis…ed. 17 Theorem 1 provides another interesting class of common agency games that possess the no-rent property.
Readers who are familiar with the common agency game literature may …nd it odd that we have not mentioned coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE: Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1987), which is the central solution concept in common agency games. 18 The standard de…nition of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium requires that all reduced games (where the outsiders of a coalition keep their strategies …xed, and the members of the coalition play a game) belong to the same class of games. Unfortunately, however, in our game, this is not true. If outsiders make their salary o¤ers and demands to coalition-members, then the matchmaker will have preferences over the matchings it chooses. We have assumed that the matchmaker cares only about the pro…t made from matching. This is why we do not mention coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in this paper. However, if we allow the matchmaker to have preference over matchings, we can 16 A system (V (S)) S N is convex if and only if for all S; T N ,
17 For example, imagine N = ff 1 ; w 1 ; w 2 g with y 11 = y 12 = 1. Letting S = ff 1 ; w 1 g and T = ff 1 ; w 2 g, we can see a violation of convexity.
18 Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that TNE and CPNE are equivalent in a utility space. Under the no-rent property, Laussel and Le Breton (2001) and Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) show the equivalences of CPNE and the core of underlying TU game, and CPNE and SNE, respectively. extend Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.
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Theorem 2' . The sets of outcomes of TNE, SNE, and CPNE in the matchmaker game of the one-to-one assignment problem and the set of stable assignments (the core) are all equivalent.
Corollary 2' . The set of stable assignments (the core) of the one-to-one assignment problem is implemented by the matchmaker game in CPNE and SNE.
Although the above results indicate a close relationship between our matchmaker game and the common agency game, we can say that the above results are speci…c to the one-to-one problem. In a many-to-one assignment problem, the situation is completely di¤erent. What are the di¤erences? In a one-to-one problem, the …rm cares about who it is to be matched with: thus, a …rm bids on each worker as a potential partner. In contrast, in a many-to-one problem, a …rm must bid on each subset of workers: there is no longer a one-to-one relationship between a salary for a worker and a bid. Moreover, the de…nition of TNE is no longer clear when we talk about salary o¤ers to each worker. In fact, as we will see below (Example 4), the common agency game generated from a matchmaker game may leave a positive rent to a matchmaker in a Nash equilibrium or in a TNE even in an additive environment. Example 4. There are two …rms and three workers N = ff 1 ; f 2 ; w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g. All …rms and workers are symmetric. Each …rm has two positions q f 1 = q f 2 = 2. For all i = 1; 2 and all j = 1; 2; 3, d w j f i = 0 and y f i w j = 2. Unique SNE (up to permutations) in a matchmaker game is ( ; s; ) such that f i (w j ) = 2 and s w j (f i ) = 2 for all i and j, and (f 1 ) = fw 1 ; w 2 g and (f 2 ) = fw 3 g. The salaries are pinned down due to excess demand for workers. Clearly, there is no rent for the matchmaker in this case. However, in a common agency Example 4a: Unique SNE with zero rent Example 4b: Positive rent TNE in matchmaker game under common agency game game, we have the following TNE ( ; s; ): f i (fw j g) = 1 for all i and j, and f i (fw j ; w j 0 g) = 3 (if …rm f i is willing to pay 3 in total if it is matched with subset fw j ; w j 0 g) for all i, j, and j 0 , and w j (f i ) = 1 for all i and j, and (f 1 ) = fw 1 ; w 2 g and (f 2 ) = fw 3 g. This is a TNE, 20 since …rms are indi¤erent between hiring one or two workers. However, the matchmaker receives a rent of 1 from f 1 . Note that …rms are better o¤ in this TNE in a common agency game: they obtain positive pro…ts.
This example shows that a common agency interpretation of our matchmaker game is valid only in the case of a one-to-one assignment problem. However, note that the e¢ cient matching is achieved in every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the common agency game, although the matchmaker earns a positive rent (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) .
One may wonder whether we can restore the equivalence results under an additive environment by applying TNE to a one-to-one problem played by positions and workers instead of …rms and workers. Let each position act as 20 The set of TNE would be fi (fw j g) = x 2 [0; 2] for all i and j, and fi (fw j ; w j 0 g) = 2 + x for all i, j, and j 0 , and w j (f i ) = x for all i and j, and ( (f 1 ); (f 2 )) 2 f(fw i ; w j g; fw k g) ; (fw i ; w j g; fw k g)g for any distinct i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g. a …rm using a truthful strategy (a position-wise truthful strategy), and let us call a Nash equilibrium with a position-wise truthful strategy a position-wise TNE. The following simple example shows that the set of stable assignments and the outcome set of position-wise TNE are di¤erent.
Example 5. Consider a position-wise TNE, that is, each position announces a truthful strategy relative to its partnered worker. Let F = ff g and W = fw 1 ; w 2 g with q f = 2. Let y f w 1 = 5 and y f w 2 = 2. Clearly, the set of stable assignments is f(v; u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 R 3 + : v + u 1 + u 2 = 7; u 1 5; and u 2 2g. However, in a position-wise TNE, positions compete with each other, and the set of outcomes is f(v; u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 R 3 + : v + u 1 + u 2 = 7; 3 u 1 5; 0 u 2 2; and u 1 = u 2 + 3g.
These two examples show that a common agency game generated from a many-to-one assignment problem has very di¤erent properties from a one-toone assignment problem. Thus, we can conclude that our matchmaker game is generally di¤erent from the common agency game.
